Decoy routing is a promising new approach for censorship circumvention that relies on traffic re-direction by volunteer autonomous systems. Decoy routing is subject to a fundamental censorship attack, called routing around decoy (RAD), in which the censors re-route their clients' Internet traffic in order to evade decoy routing autonomous systems. Recently, there has been a heated debate in the community on the real-world feasibility of decoy routing in the presence of the RAD attack. Unfortunately, previous studies rely their analysis on heuristic-based mechanisms for decoy placement strategies as well as ad hoc strategies for the implementation of the RAD attack by the censors.
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CCS '16, October 24 -28, 2016 , Vienna, Austria of DR [16] , Telex [26] , and Cirripede [12] . Decoy routing presents a new paradigm in censorship circumvention: instead of the traditional approach of mounting circumvention at the edges of the Internet [2, 7, 11, 13, 15] , i.e., on computer proxies, decoy routing suggests to deploy circumvention in the middle of the Internet, i.e., on Internet routers called decoy routers. Decoy routers are deployed by (friendly) Internet autonomous systems (AS) that install the decoy routing functionality on their existing Internet routers, e.g., on their border routers. To circumvent censorship using a decoy routing system, a censored user will need to generate traffic towards benign, non-blocked Internet destinations in such a way that it contains some covert signal for the decoy routers. If the user's traffic is intercepted by some decoy router on the path to its non-blocked (overt) destination, the intercepting decoy router will re-direct the client's traffic towards the forbidden Internet destination requested by the user.
The decoy routing approach aims at defeating the standard censorship techniques deployed against traditional proxy-based circumvention systems like Tor. Particularly, decoy routing defeats the widely used IP address-based censorship as clients' connections will appear to the censors to be destined to some overt non-forbidden IP addresses. However, the end-to-middle behavior of decoy routing circumvention enables a unique routing-based censorship attack, called routing around decoys (RAD) [23] . In this attack, first introduced by Schuchard et al. [23] , the censors modify the BGP routing policies of the ASes they control in order to prevent their Internet users from reaching the ASes that deploy decoy routers. This presents a fundamental attack on decoy routing systems [8, 12, 16, 25, 26] , regardless of their specific system design. In some sense, RAD on decoy routing is equivalent to IP address filtering on proxy-based circumvention systems.
The literature has recently seen a heated debate on the impact of RAD attack on decoy routing systems. While Schuchard et al. [23] present RAD as a fundamental weakness of decoy routing systems, Houmansadr et al. [14] argue RAD to be prohibitively expensive to the censors (both socially and economically) given specific decoy placement strategies. Unfortunately, existing work on decoy routing misses to perform a fundamental analysis on the feasibility of RAD. Instead, previous work, either magnifying or downplaying RAD, evaluate the attack only against heuristicbased decoy placement strategies and ad hoc deployments of RAD. Particularly, Schuchard et al. [23] demonstrate the attack only against some, but not the best, decoy placement strategy, and Houmansadr et al. [14] evaluate the costs of RAD to the censors for a specific deployment of RAD, but not the best deployment of RAD. Cesareo et al. [4] analyze the optimum placement strategy for decoy routers-but in the absence of a RAD adversary-and Kim et al. [18] derive some sub-optimal decoy placement strategies without considering the economical and social costs of the RAD attack as demonstrated by Houmansadr et al. [14] .
In this paper, we take the first systematic approach to the problem of decoy placement in decoy routing systems under adversarial settings. We use game theory to model the interactions between the parties involved in a decoy routing setting, particularly the censors and decoy routing deployers. We quantify the benefits and costs to each of the players due to their different strategies, and formulate their best responses under various settings. We use game theoretic algorithms to derive the best strategies for the placement of decoy routers as well the best strategies for the implementation of the RAD attack by the censors for different types of censors and for various decoy deployment budgets.
This work is also the first to study the potential business models for the real-world deployment of decoy routing systems. We consider two business models in our analysis: First, we consider a central deployment strategy in which an organization with a finite monetary budget pays autonomous systems for their deployment of decoy routers. This model is in some sense similar to systems like Tor and VPNs in which a central organization collects funding (either through donations or by charging the users) and pays the expenses of deploying the circumvention system (e.g., through running cloud servers). Our game-theoretic analysis derives the optimal set of ASes for decoy deployment, i.e., one that optimizes censorship resistance given the deploying organization's finite monetary budget.
The second business model we study is an autonomous deployment of decoy routers. In this model, Internet ASes decide individually whether or not to join a decoy routing system. ASes will receive monetary incentives for deploying decoy routers, e.g., by charging the clients, but also risk losing transit traffic if they get blocked by the RAD censors. Our game theoretic analysis finds the best response for each Internet AS given the strongest deployment of RAD optimized per Internet route by the censors.
We simulate the two decoy deployment models and derive the optimal decoy placement strategies and optimal censorship actions for various nation-state censors and under various assumptions about budget and censorship preferences. We show that the optimal decoy placement strategies we derive significantly outperform the (heuristics-based) strategies of previous work [14] in defeating censorship.
BACKGROUND

Decoy Routing Approach
Decoy routing circumvention was first proposed by the three independent works of DR [16] , Telex [26] , and Cirripede [12] . Unlike traditional circumvention systems [2, 7, 11, 13, 15] in which circumvention is deployed on Internet endpoints, i.e., on computer proxies, decoy routing systems are implemented by some Internet autonomous systems (ASes), called decoy ASes, who mount circumvention functionality on their Internet routers, i.e., decoy routers.
In order to use decoy routers for circumvention, a censored client will need to establish one or multiple TLS [6] connections to arbitrary, non-blocked Internet destinations (e.g., non-forbidden HTTPS websites) in such a way that her traffic gets routed by at least one decoy router. The client, then, will send a covert signal to the intercepting decoy router stating her request for censorship circumvention. Finally, if the decoy router accepts to serve that client, she will deflect the client's traffic to the censored destinations requested by the client. This defeats the standard IP-based censorship as the censored client's network packets will have an IP address that corresponds to an overt non-forbidden TLS destination-but not the actual forbidden (covert) destination.
The specific design of decoy routing systems varies from one design to the other [8, 12, 16, 25, 26] . For instance, Cirripede [12] uses the initial sequence number of TCP connections for sending the covert signals to decoy routers, in contrast to Telex [26] 's use of the TLS ClientHello random nonce. Also, while DR [16] and Telex install all of the decoy routing operations on Internet routers, Cirripede uses some external servers for processing the deflected traffic. We refer the reader to the original design papers [8, 12, 16, 25, 26] for further details. Our analysis in this paper is independent of the specific design of a decoy routing system, and therefore applies to all decoy routing systems.
Routing Around Decoys (RAD)
A fundamental attack on the decoy routing approach is the routing around decoys (RAD) attack, first investigated by Schuchard et al. [23] . In this attack, a censoring country modifies the BGP routing decisions made by its ASes in order to render decoy routers unusable by its censored citizens. More specifically, if the standard (i.e., best) BGP route from a censored client to an Internet destination contains a decoy AS, the censoring country will discard that (best) BGP route and instead use another decoy-free route that she knows to that Internet destination (Schuchard et al. [23] demonstrate that censors can identify decoy ASes by sending particular probes). We refer to the alternative route chosen by a censoring AS as an RBGP route, in contrast to the normal BGP route.
RAD is a fundamental attack on decoy routing systems [8, 12, 16, 25, 26] regardless of their specific system designs. In some sense, RAD on decoy routing is equivalent to IP address filtering on proxy-based circumvention systems. However, performing RAD may impose various costs to the RAD censors, as discussed in previous work [14, 23] [14] . Such NVF routes impose extra monetary expenses to the censor. C 4 censor quantifies the fraction of a censor's paths that switch to the expensive NVF routes. 5. Less-Preferred Routes (C 5 censor ). The use of RBGP may force a censoring AS to route some packets via a lesspreferred route, e.g., by switching from a route through a peer AS to a route through a provider AS. This increases the monetary expenses of routing on such routes for the censor. C 5 censor is the fraction of the censor's Internet paths that switch to less-preferred routes due to RAD. 6. New Transit ASes (C 6 censor ). For the RAD attack to be more effective, Schuchard et al. [23] suggest that censoring ASes may share their decoy-free routes. However, this may require the censor to transform some of its stub ASes into transit ASes, as discussed by Houmansadr et al. [14] . C 6 censor quantifies the fraction of such new transit ASes.
Past Studies on Decoy Placement
As noted earlier, Schuchard et al. [23] and Houmansadr et al. [14] analyzed the-non-optimal-placement of decoy routers in the presence of a RAD adversary. Earlier, Houmansadr et al. [12] , Cesareo et al. [4] , and Kim et al. [18] studied the placement of decoy routers in a non-adversarial setting, i.e., ignoring RAD. Our work is the first to study the optimal decoy placement strategies in the presence of RAD considering the costs to both censors and decoy deployers. We are also the first to study the optimal implementation of the RAD attack; unlike previous studies of RAD [14, 23] , we consider a censor who optimizes the RAD attack by making the routing decisions per individual Internet paths. Table 1 summarizes the main notations used in this paper. Our game-theoretic analysis consists of three types of players, censor, decoy, and AS k , as introduced later. ASi denotes the i-th autonomous system, and Acens and A f ree are the set of censor-controlled and free Internet ASes, respectively (obviously, they differ for different state censors).
NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
We define every ordered pair of ASes, Pi,j = (ASi, ASj), as an Internet path from the first AS to the second AS. Therefore, Pi,j = Pj,i. By contrast, we define Ri,j = R(Pi,j) as the BGP route (simply, route 1 ) for path Pi,j, i.e., the BGP route from ASi to ASj. A route, if exists, will be an ordered list of ASes, Ri,j = (ASi, AS
where each AS T * is a transit AS (if the route does not exist, Ri,j = ∅). We call the route Ri,j to be a decoyed route if at least one of the ASes on the route is a decoy AS, otherwise we call it a decoy-free route.
For each path, Pi,j, the censor will decide one of the two actions of a BGP or a RBGP in order to route the packets on that path, as described later. Ac = (a(Pi,j)|∀Pi,j ∈ P) is the strategy of censor, where P is the set of all paths. In our first game, decoy's strategy, A d , is the set of ASes it selects for decoy deployment. In our second game, each AS k decides individually from {a Deploy , a N otDeploy } to whether or not deploy decoy routers. Censorship Metric: The goal of a RAD-capable censor is to minimize the number of the Internet paths in P that are served through decoyed routes (and therefore can be used by the censor's clients for circumvention). We scale each of these routes with the size of its origin (censoring) AS since this represents the number of potential censored clients who can use that decoyed route. We additionally scale each decoyed route with the size of its destination AS: as discussed by Houmansadr et al. [12] , the more overt IP addresses available to the decoy users the better unobservability the system will offer to its users. We therefore formulate the effectiveness of censorship by a RAD-capable censor with a censorship metric defined as:
(1) where we define δ(·) as δ(Ri,j) = 1 Ri,j has at least one decoy 0 Ri,j has no decoy ASes or if Ri,j = ∅
Note that if the censor makes a path unreachable (i.e., Ri,j = ∅) we still consider that a successful censorship, though it will be at the cost of unreachability.
GAME ONE: CENTRAL DECOY DEPLOYMENT
In this game, we consider a central decision maker for the decoy routing system. That is, we consider a decoy routing system player, decoy, who selects the Internet ASes to deploy decoy routing. The decoy player has a finite monetary budget, which she uses to pay the selected ASes for their deployment of decoy routers. The fees paid to each AS will be proportional to their importance in the operation of decoy routing (e.g., their sizes).
This model captures the financial model behind existing centrally-operated circumvention systems like Tor [7] , in which a circumvention organization collects monetary funding for the operation of the circumvention system (in Tor the funding goes to paying staff and running some servers). As shown by Houmansadr et al. [14] , the location of decoy routers is critical in resisting RAD. Therefore, the goal of decoy in our game is to choose the optimal set of ASes for decoy deployment such that this maximizes resistance to the RAD attack given decoy's finite monetary budget.
Players and Their Actions
Our game is played between decoy and a censoring adversary, censor. We consider both censor and decoy to be rational, i.e., each make their decisions in a way to maximize their utility functions, as defined later.
1. Central Decoy Placement System (decoy): The decoy player is the single entity who chooses a set of Internet ASes and pays them money to mount decoy routing on their border routers. The objective of the decoy player is to provide uncensored Internet access to a large fraction of users censored by censor.
Recall that A f ree is the set of all Internet ASes outside the censorship region, and Acens is the set of ASes controlled The players in the two games, as described later ASi
The i-th autonomous system (AS) Acens Set of all ASes in the censoring country A f ree Set of all ASes out of the censoring country ||ASi|| Size of the AS ASi (number of IP addresses) Pi,j = (ASi, ASj)
The Internet path from ASi to ASj. Note that Pi,j = Pj,i.
The BGP route from ASi to ASj P Set of all paths from Acens to A f ree a(Pi,j) ∈ {a BGP , a RBGP } The action that censor takes for path Pi,j. Action a BGP is to use BGP do derive R(Pi,j), whereas a RBGP is to use RBGP. Ac = (a(Pi,j)|∀Pi,j ∈ P)
Vector of censor's routing decisions (i.e., censor's strategy)
Set of decoy ASes (which is decoy's strategy)
Deploy , a N otDeploy } The strategy of the AS k player in game two. a Deploy is to deploy decoy routing and a N otDeploy is otherwise.
censor's profile by censor. Decoy's action space is the set of all subsets of
is a possible action for decoy in the game. Taking the
.., AS k } action by decoy means that she will pay the ASes AS1,...,AS k to deploy decoy routers. We consider decoy to have a finite monetary budget, F , to pay the selected ASes in A d for decoy deployment. That is, if C(ASi) is the fee decoy pays to ASi for decoy deployment, we have that
Censorship entity (censor):
The censor player is a nation-state that censors the Internet access of its citizen Internet users. The main objective of censor in our game is to interfere with the operation of decoy, i.e., prevent censored users from using the decoy routing system for getting around censorship. The main technique used by censor to do so is the RAD attack described in Section 2.2.
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For each Internet path P s,d = (ASs, AS d ), where ASs is an AS controlled by censor (i.e., a Chinese AS) and AS d is a non-censored AS, censor takes one of the following two actions: if a(P s,d ) = a BGP censor will use the standard BGP protocol to find the BGP route from ASs to AS d , and if a(P s,d ) = a RBGP , censor will use RBGP (as described in Section 2.2) to find the route (as discussed in Section 2.2, an RBGP route may not exist, i.e., R s,d = ∅). The actions taken by censor for different Internet paths are taken individually; censor's strategy in the game is Ac = (a(Pi,j)|∀Pi,j ∈ P).
Utility Functions
We derive the game-theoretic utility functions of the two players.
The Decoy Player
Benefit: The goal of decoy is to maximize the censorship resistance offered to the censored users. We therefore quantify her benefit with the censorship metric of (1):
2 RAD is the core attack known against decoy routing systems. Our model can be extended to consider other attacks proposed in the future.
Cost: Decoy's cost is the sum of the monetary fees she has to pay to the selected ASes for decoy deployment:
where C(ASi) is the deployment fee charged by ASi, which includes the installation and operational costs of decoy routing. Therefore, we estimate C(ASi) based on the size of ASi, as well as the economic/political relationship between ASi's country and censor, i.e.,
where Relation(ASi) represents ASi's relationship with censor. ρ0 transforms the cost to dollar values. We will discuss the choice of these parameters in Section 6.3. We assume that decoy uses all of its budget, F , for decoy deployment. Therefore, we quantify the utility of decoy as
where F is decoy's finite budget. Decoy's objective is to maximize U decoy subject to the C decoy ≤ F constraint. Intuitively, the larger the budget, the stronger the censorship resistance offered by decoy.
The Censor Player
Benefit: The main objective of censor is to prevent its Internet users from using the decoy routing system for circumvention. Therefore, we quantify its benefit with the censorship metric defined in (1):
Cost: As discussed in Section 2.2, switching to RBGP instead of the standard BGP for an Internet path may impose two types of costs on the censor player. First, it can degrade the quality-of-service for censor's benign (i.e., noncircumvention) Internet users, potentially causing collateral damage. Second, it may incur higher monetary costs to censor's ASes for routing packets. We quantify the utility function of censor based on the cost metrics C 
We define β = (β0, β1, ..β6) as censor's profile, which demonstrates how much she cares about each of the cost metrics with respect to the enforced censorship. In Section 6, we perform our analysis for different censor profiles. The objective of censor in the game is to maximize Ucensor.
Mechanism Design
We consider the set of actions available to the censor and decoy players as well as their corresponding utility functions (as derived in Sections 4.1 and 4.2), to be public knowledge. Therefore, we model this game as a "complete information" game [21] . This allows each player to simulate the game in order to find her own best response. That is, decoy can use our analysis to identify the location of optimum decoy ASes given her finite budget, and censor can use the analysis to decide her optimum routing actions for its Internet paths. Best response of decoy.
The best response of decoy given censor's action Ac is the set of ASes chosen for decoy deployment that maximizes decoy's utility function of (6) given her known finite budget:
This problem can be interpreted as a "budgeted maximum coverage" problem [17] , which is known to be NP-hard. However, we are able to converge to the solution through approximation. As we prove in Lemma 2, decoy's utility function is a monotone submodular function [9] . This allows us to use Leskovec et al.'s greedy algorithm [20] to find a sub-optimal best response for decoy within O(1 − 1 e ). Algorithm 1 sketches our greedy algorithm. Best response of censor. The best response for censor given decoy's action A d is an Ac vector (as defined in Section 4.1) that maximizes the utility function of (8):
We consider the elements of Ac to be independent, i.e., the actions for different paths are taken independently by censor. This is because (a) the benefit function of (7) can be decomposed into the independent elements of ||Ai|| · ||Aj||(1 − δ(Ri,j)), and, (b) each of the cost components in (8) can be represented as the sum of the costs across all paths. 3 Using this independence assumption, we decompose the maximization problem of (10) into ||P|| independent maximization problems, which is solvable in polynomial time (i.e., with 2||P|| computations since there are two potential actions for each path). Finding the Equilibrium: The goal of our analysis is to find an equilibrium point for the game, which is a pair (A * d , A * c ) that satisfies both (9) and (10) concurrently. In a real-world deployment of decoy routers, we expect the players reach such an equilibrium point after potentially changing their strategies for several times.
In our analysis we only seek a pure Nash equilibrium, but not a mixed one [21] . This is because mixed strategies do not have real-world interpretations in scenarios where players' actions are observable to each other (see the network design problem [1] and facility location game [24] as examples). In our game also the censor and decoy players can observe the actions taken by each other: Schuchard et al. [23] demonstrate that censors can infer the identities of decoy ASes with very high confidence. Also, decoy can observe censor's routing decisions by sending decoy routing traffic from inside the censorship region to the decoy routers.
However, not every game has a pure Nash equilibrium [24] (or if it does, finding it is not necessarily straightforward). We therefore solve the game by finding a pure ε−Nash equilibrium through empirical analysis. 4 Particularly, we use the best-response dynamics algorithm [19] for converging to an ε−Nash equilibrium. The algorithm is run in multiple iterations until no player can improve its utility beyond a threshold ε by changing strategy.
GAME TWO: AUTONOMOUS DECOY DEPLOYMENT
In this game, we consider the financial model where autonomous systems decide individually whether or not to deploy a decoy routing system. Unlike game one in which a central decoy player pays ASes to deploy decoy routing, in this game each AS individually decides to deploy or not based on her own economic interests.
Players and Their Actions
This game is played between n + 1 players: a censor player, which is the same as the one in game one, and n autonomous system players, which are the ASes in the free world, i.e., n = ||A f ree ||. From a high level, the objective of each AS player is to maximize her monetary revenue, and the goal of censor is to optimize the enforced censorship.
1. Censorship entity (censor): This player is exactly the same as the censor player of game one (Section 4.1).
n AS Players
This includes all ASes not-controlled by censor. Each AS player will decide autonomously whether or not to deploy decoy routing based on her economic interests. We show AS k 's action as a k ∈ {a Deploy , a N otDeploy }, where a Deploy is the decision to deploy decoy routing and a N otDeploy is otherwise.
Utility Functions
We quantify the utility functions of the players as follows.
The Censor Player
This is the same as what we derived in (8) for game one.
AS Players
For each AS player AS k , we define SAS k as the set of all routes in P (from Acens to A f ree ) that go through AS k :
SAS k ={Rs,t|ASs ∈ Acens, ASt ∈ A f ree , AS k ∈ Rs,t} (11) For each route Rs,t ∈ SAS k , AS k will earn monetary revenue for transiting traffic on Rs,t if AS k is a "provider" [14] on Rs,t. The action that AS k chooses from {a Deploy , a N otDeploy } in the game, combined with the actions of the other n − 1 AS players and censor, may impact AS k 's revenue (i.e., utility) for each route Rs,t ∈ SAS k as follows:
• If censor takes the a RBGP action for Rs,t, AS k will lose the transit revenue (if any) she would normally receive for that route.
• If censor takes the a BGP action for Rs,t, AS k will keep the transit revenue for that route. Additionally, AS k will earn extra monetary revenue for serving the decoy routing users who use Rs,t only if (1) AS k decides to be a decoy (a k = a Deploy ) and (2) AS k is the first decoy AS on Rs,t. In a practical deployment, this revenue may come from different sources: decoy clients can pay directly for the service they receive (similar to paid VPN services), pro-freedom NGOs can pay decoy routers per the volume of decoy traffic they serve, etc. Note that the actions of each AS player may impact the utility of other AS players as well, even if they choose the a N otDeploy action. For each route Rs,t, we quantify the monetary revenue of transit traffic as well as decoy traffic to be proportional to the volume of the traffic routed on that route. For the lack of comprehensive data on traffic loads across Internet routes, we use ||ASs|| · ||ASt|| as an estimate. Therefore, we quantify AS k 's utility as: (12) where the first term in the summation corresponds to the transit traffic revenue and the second term is the decoy routing revenue. σ(Rs,t, AS k ) = 1 if AS k is a decoy and it is the first decoy AS on Rs,t, otherwise σ(Rs,t, AS k ) = 0. We use γ to scale the decoy routing revenue with respect to the transit revenue. We call γ as the service fee of decoy ASes. ρ1 is a scaling factor to convert to the dollar value.
Mechanism Design
Similar to the game one, we consider the set of actions available to each of the censor and AS players as well as their corresponding utility functions to be public knowledge. Therefore, our game is a "complete information" game [21] ,
Algorithm 2 Finding equilibrium in game two
Def refineEQ(ASes,R):
which enables censor and each AS player to simulate the game and find their own best responses. Best response of censor. We derive this as:
where Ucensor is given by (8) , and a k is the action of AS k . Best response of ASes. The best response for an AS player, AS k , is the action a * k ∈ {a Deploy , a N otDeploy } that maximizes her utility UAS k derived in (12) given the actions of the other n − 1 AS players and censor: (14) for all n ASes and (13) (n + 1 equations). Similar to the previous game, we only consider the pure equilibrium, since mixed strategies do not have real-world interpretations in the decoy application.
Finding the equilibrium in this game poses as a complex computational problem as it involves n + 1 equations. To be able to solve this in polynomial time, we translate the game into a game played in three steps in multiple rounds. Algorithm 2 summarizes how we simulate the game.
Step 1 (n ASes taking actions): In this step, each of the n AS players take an action that maximizes their utility in (14) (i.e., a * k for AS k ) given a fixed, known censor action, Ac, which may or may not be censor's equilibrium action. In other words, given censor's known routing decisions for all Internet routes, each AS decides to whether or not deploy decoy routing based on her utility function. Each AS's action can potentially impact the utility of other AS players. Therefore, we model step 1 as a "non-cooperative facility location" game [24] . A facility location game is composed of multiple service providers as well as multiple users seeking service, where the game aims at finding the best locations for servers to maximize their individual benefits.
We use the best response dynamics [21] to find the equilibrium of this game, which is known as a standard mechanism for facility location games [24] and is shown to be computable in polynomial time by Vetta [24] . The outcome of this step is a A * d set, containing the set of decoy ASes.
Step 2 (censor taking actions): Assuming that censor knows the actions taken by all AS players, i.e., he knows A d , censor will derive his best response A * c given in (13) . We use the mechanism described in Section 4.3 (under "Best response of censor") to derive A * c , which is a polynomial time algorithm as discussed in that section.
Step 3 (Refineing): If the pair (A * d , A * c ), derived in steps 1 and 2, is an ε−Nash equilibrium point we terminate the algorithm, otherwise we go to step 1. If an ε−Nash equilibrium has been achieved, the improvement in each player's utility function will be smaller than ε if the players decide to change their actions.
Our game is composed of n AS players. As n is a large number (e.g., n = 49, 745 for China) some of the AS players may take longer to reach an equilibrium state in our simulations. We, therefore, terminate the game when a large ratio (τ = 0.9) of AS players have reached their equilibrium, i.e., when A d does not change significantly between the consecutive iterations.
SIMULATIONS
Experimental Setup and Datasets
We use C-BGP [22] , 5 a widely used Internet route simulator, to infer BGP routes between Internet ASes in our experiments. We also code an RBGP simulator in Python that implements the RAD attack as described before [14, 23] . Our RBGP simulator uses C-BGP as its engine to find the routes. We run our computation-intensive simulations (i.e., routes between over 50,000 Internet ASes in different settings) on Google Compute Engine.
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Our game-theoretic algorithms (e.g., to find equilibrium) are implemented in Python and are run on a Linux box with 64GB of memory and 3.5GHz Xeon(R) CPU. We use multiple optimization techniques to speed up the algorithms, including dynamic programming, lazy evaluation, and inmemory databases. Particularly, we use the Redis 7 inmemory data structure to manage the tremendous volume of routing records, DNS records, and the other datasets used in our experiments.
We make use of the following datasets in our experiments:
• We use CAIDA's "Jan 2016" AS relationships database [3] to model the business relationship between ASes.
• We use GeLite2 geo-location database 8 for the mapping between IP addresses and geographical locations.
• We use CAIDA's AS rank dataset 9 to map between ASes and IP address ranges, also for AS sizes.
• We use the OEC 10 dataset [10] to infer the economical relationship between countries.
• We use the DNS Census dataset 11 composed of about 2.5 billion DNS records to find the domain names belonging to various censoring countries. This is particularly used in evaluating C 2 censor .
Profiles for the Censor Player
As described earlier, we characterize each real-world censor with a profile, β = (β0, ..., β6), which represents how much that censor cares about the cost metrics compared to the achieved censorship. More specifically, β0 represents the importance of censorship effectiveness to censor, whereas β1 to β6 show how much censor wants to avoid the collateral censorship costs, as defined in Section 2.2.
Intuitively, the game's outcome highly depends on the censor profile, i.e., β impacts censor's best routing strategy as well as the best decoy placement strategy. We therefore perform our analysis for different censor profiles. We particularly use the representative profiles shown in Table 2 in our analysis. In the real world, a nation-state censor may change its profile from time to time, e.g., may take a harsher profile during a political unrest.
A "wealthy" censor can sustain large monetary expenses, therefore, her profile has low values for β4 to β6, which scale the monetary cost metrics of C 4 censor to C 6 censor . By contrast, a "poor" censor has high values for β4 to β6. A "QoScautious" censor strongly desires to avoid degradation in Internet quality-of-service for its citizens, so she has high values for β1 to β3, which scale the QoS cost metrics of C 1 censor to C 3 censor . This is in contrast to a "QoS-ignorant" censor who does not care about the QoS cost metrics. As an extreme censor profile, the "irrational" censor aims to deploy the strongest form of censorship with little concern about QoS and with ample monetary resources (a high β0 shows the censor's desire for the strongest censorship). We also define the "reachability-cautious" and "domain-cautious" profiles, that aim to preserve specific QoS properties, e.g., T4 is highly concerned about Internet reachability for its users.
In our analysis, we use the values in Table 3 as high and low values for each βi. Note that what is important to our analysis is not the absolute values of βi's, but how they compare relatively.
Other Parameters and Settings
Relation(AS i ): The Relation(ASi) function represents the economic relationship between ASi and the censoring country, and is part of the decoy deployment cost function in (5). The stronger this relationship, the higher the economical costs of decoy deployment for ASi (i.e., the less likely for ASi to deploy decoy routers). We quantify Relation(ASi) based on the economic relationship of ASi's country with censor. Specifically, we estimate Relation(ASi) with the sum of the import and export rates between the two countries, derived from the OEC dataset [10] . Also, as suggested previously [14, 23] , we consider the ring ASes of a censoring country to be extremely unlikely to deploy decoy routers due to their direct business interaction with the censoring ASes. We therefore assign significantly large values to Relation(ASi) for all ring ASes of censor, effectively causing no ring AS to deploy decoy routers in our simulations. F, ρ0, ρ1, and γ: We will present our simulation results for different values of F/ρ0 in game one, and for different values of γ in game two. F/ρ0, which is the budget ratio, represents the monetary budget of the central decoy deployer in game one. Also, the service fee γ represents the monetary fee to be charged by decoy ASes for decoy traffic in game two. The value of the ρ1 parameter in (12) does not matter as it does not impact the maximization problem of (14) . C i censor : We derive these as defined in Section 2.2. Mapping ASes to countries: We use the GeLite2 and CAIDA AS rank datasets to map the 52, 351 Internet ASes to countries. Some ASes are assigned to multiple countries in the two datasets. If an AS is assigned to both a censoring country and a free country, we consider it as a censoring AS to make the simulations in censor's favor. We also identify each country's ring ASes as the ASes with a direct link to the country's ASes. Table 4 shows the number of ASes and ring ASes for the censoring countries of our experiments. On the optimality of the results: As discussed earlier, our algorithms find the near-optimal strategies for decoy placement and censorship, i.e., our results are ε-Nash equilibria with ε = 0.1 in most cases. To find the most conservative decoy placement, we always let censor make the final move in the games.
Game One Experiments
We use the game theoretic analysis of Section 4 to converge to the optimal decoy placement strategies when the censors are taking optimal censorship actions. We perform our simulations for the four censoring countries in Table 4 , which represent censors with various Internet connectivity (and therefore different censorship capability). We start our evaluation by discussing the results for China, which is the strongest censoring country among the list due to its highly well-connected network. Next, we will compare the results across the censoring countries. How the routes change. The routing decisions made by censor in the game impacts the Internet routes of the censor's Internet users. For instance, as we see in Figure 1 if decoy has a budget ratio of F/ρ0 = 5 * 10 6 , the optimal routing decision of the Chinese censor with a profile T1 causes 10.8% of the routes to become NVF, and 1.2% to go through less-preferred routes. For this particular censor profile, even the best censorship strategy leaves 16.3% of the routes available to the Chinese users for decoy routing. Impact of decoy budget. As intuitively expected, decoy's budget significantly impacts the success of decoy routing circumvention in game one. That is, with more budget decoy can choose more ASes and/or more effective ASes for decoy deployment. As noted earlier, we use the budget ratio (F/ρ0) as a metric to represent the monetary budget available to the central decoy deployer, decoy. Figure 2 shows how decoy's budget impacts the utility of the decoy routing system as well as the censorship metric for China as the censor with a T1 (QoS-cautious, wealthy) profile. As expected, increasing decoy's budget improves censorship resistance, i.e., reduces the censorship metric S, as it allows the central decoy deployment organization to install decoy routing on more Internet ASes, and/or on the more effective ASes (e.g., those on more routes). The figure also shows how different cost metrics for censor change with decoy's budget. As can be seen, the monetary cost metrics (C 4 censor to C 6 censor ) first show an increase with F/ρ0 but at some point start declining since switching to more expensive routes will no longer improve the censorship success for censor.
Note that our evaluation is with respect to the budget ratio parameter, F/ρ0, but not the actual budget F . One can infer the actual dollar budget by investigating the real-world deployment cost of decoy routers in (5), therefore estimating and eliminating ρ0 from F/ρ0. We leave this to future work. Impact of censor profiles. The optimal censorship strategy depends on the censor's profile, i.e., censors will make routing decisions based on their preferences on the cost metrics with respect to the censorship metric. This in turn will impact the optimal set of decoy ASes for the central decoy deployer. Table 5 compares the cost metrics as well as the censorship metric for China for different censorship profiles. We see that the censorship costs as well as the achieved censorship largely varies across the profiles. For instance, comparing T2 (QoS-cautious, poor) and T3 (QoS-ignorant, poor) we see that if the Chinese censor does not care about the QoS offered to its clients, it can improve the censorship metric from 0.229 to 0.949 (given the same monetary resources for the censor). This, however, comes at the price of making 70.3% of all Internet routes becoming unreachable to the Chinese users, potentially causing collateral damage and unrest. On the other hand, we see that if China is committed to preserving QoS, i.e., not to cause collateral damage, even if they spend significant amounts of money (i.e., profiles T1 and T4) the censorship metric they can achieve will be around 0.27. This is a promising finding for the decoy routing approach indicating that if there is enough monetary budget for decoy deployment, "rational" censors will not be able to evade it even if they spend big money.
On the other hand, we see if China acted irrationally (profile T6) they can achieve perfect censorship at the price of significant QoS degradation to their users. This is not specific to decoy routing systems; irrational censors can always achieve Optimal (Game one) sorted [14] random-no-ring-10 [14] Figure 3: Comparing our central decoy placement strategy (game one) with state-of-the-art mechanisms [14] .
complete censorship, e.g., they can entirely disconnect their country from the Internet as witnessed in Egypt [5] .
Comparison with previous work:
We compare our (near-)optimal decoy placement mechanism with the (nonoptimal, heuristics-based) decoy placements proposed in previous work. Specifically, we compare our decoy placement with the state-of-the-art decoy placement mechanisms proposed by Houmansadr et al. [14] , i.e., the "sorted" and "random" placements. This is shown in Figure 1 for different budget ratios. As can be seen, our decoy placement mechanism is significantly more effective than previous mechanisms in defeating censorship. That is, given the same budget for decoy deployment our decoy placement results in better censorship circumvention performance, i.e., a smaller censorship metric-and this is given the "best" censorship strategy, not just some strategy as in prior work [14] . For instance, for the budget of F/ρ = e 8 our decoy placement achieves a censorship metric of 0.2 as opposed to 0.42 for "sorted" [14] . Comparing censoring countries. We perform our simulations for the 4 representative censoring countries in Table 4. The countries represent various kinds of censoring countries regarding their Internet connectivity. China has the best connectivity to the Internet with the largest number of ASes and ring ASes, whereas Syria poses a weak connectivity. Table 6 compares the censorship performance and cost metrics for the four countries for the censor profile T1 and given a fixed decoy deployment budget. We have sorted the countries in the descending order of the censorship metric. As can be seen, China poses as the strongest censor because of its highly connected Internet, while Syria is the weakest censor because of its poorly-connected Internet. We also see that even though Venezuela has less ASes than Saudi Arabia, it is a slightly stronger censor in this setting, presumably because of its larger number or ring ASes. Finally, we see that given the same budget, the optimal set of decoy ASes differ for different countries, as evident from the number of decoy ASes in each case. We use our analysis of Section 5 to converge to the optimal decoy placement strategies when the censors are taking optimal censorship actions. Similar to the previous game, we have performed our analysis for the four censoring countries in Table 4 . We start our evaluation by discussing the results for China, followed by comparison of the results across countries. How the routes change. As in game one, the routing decisions of the censor impact the Internet routes available to the censor's users. For instance, as we see in Figure 4 , for a service fee of γ = 5.0 charged by decoy ASes, the optimal routing strategy of the Chinese censor with a profile T1 causes 19.9% of the routes to become NVF, and 3.5% to go through less-preferred routes. For this particular censor profile, even the best censorship strategy leaves 9.6% of the routes available to the Chinese users for decoy routing. Impact of decoy service fee. Intuitively, higher service fees for decoy routing will incentivize more ASes to deploy decoy routing despite the risk of losing transit traffic due to censor's re-routing actions. Figure 5 shows the impact of the service fee γ on the censorship metric and the costs to the Chinese censor with a T1 (QoS-cautious, wealthy) profile. As expected, increasing the service fee improves censorship resistance as more ASes will decide to deploy decoy routers. Using this figure, one can estimate the achieved censorship resistance given particular values for the service fees charged by decoy ASes. Also, note that γ scales an AS's revenue from decoy routing with respect to its revenue from transit traffic. Therefore, a γ = 5 means that the decoy AS will charge for every MB of decoy traffic five times what she charges per MB of transit traffic. Impact of censor profiles. As in game one, the optimal censorship strategy depends on the censor's profile, i.e., the preferences of censor between censorship performance and various cost metrics. Similar to the game one, an irrational censor (profile T6) can achieve perfect censorship. In contrast to game one, in this case there will be no QoS degradation since no single AS will decide to deploy decoy routers as they will all be blocked by the irrational censor who does not care about QoS. By contrast, in game one the central decoy deployer always uses its decoy budget, therefore the irrational censor will suffer from significant QoS degradation. Comparing censoring countries. Table 8 compares the censorship performance and cost metrics for the four censorship countries of Table 4 , given a T1 censor profile and a fixed decoy service fee. We have sorted the countries in the descending order of the censorship metric. Similar to the game one, the censorship enforced by various nationstate censors is proportional to their Internet connectivity.
Game Two Experiments
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We believe that our game-theoretic analysis is a significant step towards understanding the real-world feasibility of the recently proposed decoy routing circumvention approach. Our study can be extended in various directions. First, our analysis derived optimal decoy placements against individual nation-state censors. An interesting extension would be to derive the set of optimal decoy ASes that maximizes censorship circumvention against a collection of nation-state censors (as shown through our experiments, the optimal set of decoys differs for various nation-state censors).
A second direction for future work is to expand our gametheoretic model by considering the censored clients as players in the game, i.e., they can decide to whether or not use a decoy routing system comparing factors like the service fees and the offered QoS with other circumvention technologies like the paid VPNs.
Third, in our analysis we used comparative metrics to represent the monetary expenses of decoy deployment (i.e., F/ρ and γ). An interesting extension would be translate such metrics into actual dollar values based on real-world information on the costs of equipment, transit traffic, etc.
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Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose there exists Si, Sj such that δY (R(Si, Sj)) < δX (R(Si, Sj)). Since δ(·) only takes two values, this means that δX (R(Si, Sj)) = 1 and δY (R(Si, Sj)) = 0. δX (R(Si, Sj)) = 1 means that X ∩ R(Si, Sj) = ∅. Lemma 2. U decoy in (6) is a monotone submodular function [9] .
Proof. Since U decoy = B decoy , it suffices to prove that B decoy is monotone submodular.
We first show that B decoy is submodular. We need to show [9] that for every two sets X and Y such that X, Y ⊆ A f ree ,X ⊆ Y we have: 
To prove that T in (18) is non-negative, it is enough to show that for each Ri,j, L = δ X∪{x} (Ri,j) − δX (Ri,j) − δ Y ∪{x} (Ri,j) + δY (Ri,j) is non-negative. From (2), δ(·) can only be 0 or 1. Therefore, L can be negative only in two cases: δX (·) = 1 or δ Y ∪{x} (·) = 1.
Case 1 (δX (·) = 1): We have that:
Since δ(·) is a monotone function (Lemma 1) we get:
Therefore:
so L is non-negative in case 1. Case 2 (δ Y ∪{x} (·) = 1): Given case 1, the only way L can be negative is that δ Y ∪{x} (Ri,j) = 1 and δ X∪{x} (Ri,j) = δX (Ri,j) = δY (Ri,j) = 0. We show by contradiction that this is not possible either. δ Y ∪{x} (Ri,j) = 1 means ((Y ∪ {x}) ∩ Ri,j) = ∅. We also know (Y ∩ Ri,j) = ∅ due to δY (Ri,j) = 0. Therefore, AS x is the decoy AS on the route. But, we have δ X∪{x} (Ri,j) = 0, which is in contradiction with x being a decoy AS.
This concludes proving that L ≥ 0, which in turn proves (17) . Therefore, B decoy is submodular. Now, we prove that B decoy is also a monotone function. From Lemma 1: ∀Si, Sj : δY (Ri,j) ≥ δX (Ri,j).
AS i ∈Acens AS j ∈A f ree δY (.) ≥ AS i ∈Acens AS j ∈A f ree δX (.) (26) Since ∀Si, Sj : ||ASi|| · ||ASj|| ≥ 0, we can multiply it at both sides of (26):
AS i ∈Acens AS j ∈A f ree ||ASi|| · ||ASj||δY (.) ≥ AS i ∈Acens AS j ∈A f ree ||ASi|| · ||ASj||δX (.) (27) which proves that B decoy is monotone.
